Crisis financiera 2007-2009. Cómo la burbuja inmobiliaria, las cuestiones de transparencia y rendición de cuentas generaron y agravaron la crisis


Financial crisis 2007-2009. How real estate bubble and transparency and accountability issues generated and worsen the crisis


https://doi.org/10.21670/ref.2012.26.a08

Autores/as

  • Bilal Aziz University of the Punjab, Pakistan.

Palabras clave:

sub–prime, burbuja inmobiliaria, títulos respaldados por hipotecas, conductos, riqueza y desigualdad de ingresos

Resumen

Este trabajo busca explicar algunos de los factores principales detrás de la crisis financiera de 2007–2009, con especial énfasis en la burbuja inmobiliaria, en la rendición de cuentas en el sistema financiero de Estados Unidos y en cómo estos dos factores generaron y empeoraron la crisis. La crisis financiera 2007–2009 inició con las hipotecas de alto riesgo del mercado inmobiliario, se extendió al sector financiero y, finalmente, al resto del mundo. Se dice que fue una crisis aun más grande que la Gran Depresión de 1929 y se le califica como única toda vez que no se conoce otra que haya impactado al mundo de esta manera. Este trabajo empírico pretende demostrar las causas que están en el corazón de la crisis y no han sido lo suficientemente discutidas.

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain some main factors behind the Financial Crisis 2007–2009 with a special focus on the Real Estate Bubble and Transparency and Accountability Issues in US Financial System and how these two factors generated and worsen the crisis. Financial Crisis 2007–2009, which starts from the United States sub–prime mortgage market and spread to US financial sector and later on spread to the rest of world, is said to be an even bigger crisis than the Great Depression of 1929. This crisis is unique in this way and we haven’t seen such a bigger impact world wide from any other crisis. This paper would empirically prove the main causes which are right in the heart of the crisis and least discussed

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2012-07-01

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Biografía del autor/a

Bilal Aziz

Department of Economics, University of the Punjab, Pakistan.